Translated by Amanda Coe
"One cannot trust in the midst of chaos," said Niklas Luhmann.
In fact, confusion affects the complex forms of interaction that foster trust. Hence, the importance of Reforma’s survey on the subject.
Between April 2013 and August 2015 the indicators have pointed to a lowering of trust in all measured areas. Trust in the Army went from 69% to 52%; the Catholic Church from 59 to 54; the National Commission on Human Rights from 55 to 35; the National Electoral Institute 50 to 34; the federal government from 46 to 27; Congress from 29 to 24; the Supreme Court from 42 to 24; the police from 32 to 20; and political parties from 25 to 16. Only the magnitude of the change is different in each case, not the downward trend.
Reading these reports cannot leave us indifferent. The institutions were measured, not the people, so that the phenomenon that should be addressed is just that, institutional. A first reading indicates that the two at the top of the list, the Army and the Church, inspire trust from barely little more than half of Mexicans.
If, in that institutional universe, we only stay with the three bodies involved in making and enforcing the law: Congress, government [executive branch] and judiciary, we will find that at least seven in every ten Mexicans distrust them. This is excessive. It means, without euphemisms, that a large part of society disapproves of the complete cast of constitutional powers.
When the issue of the rule of law is brought up, we cannot ignore the significance of the data. Regardless of the numbers, what is striking is the continuing decline in trust, without observing even a slight variation in any of the measured areas. Just over two years ago, the scene was already alarming; now, if nothing is done to reverse that process of decline, it will be difficult to see where it will stop.
It's posible that the velocity of the fall could decrease, as keeping with this pace would lead to an unmanageable situation in another couple of years, which does not serve the interests of the community. But this is only an assessment based on rationality prevailing. If distrust continues to rise far beyond the current level, it would imply huge risks for national communal life.
But, once on the slope of growing distrust, it would be naive to expect a spontaneous 180º change. Even on the assumption that the institutions might be doing everything well and that the ones who are wrong might be us, the governed, the centers of power would have to be aware that to change our attitude, they must first change theirs. Otherwise, if they are determined to maintain their party line and their actions, regardless of popular opinion, they must realize that they run the risk of heightened disobedience, which often results from distrust, and of being left with little choice but to be coercive.
The majority's distrust no longer distinguishes between the three bodies embodying constitutional powers. Two years ago, the government and judiciary inspired more trust than Congress; now they are at the same level, indicating a general decline in society’s perception.
Despite advertising campaigns, that is the view that society has of the institutions of power. It is not a matter of image; it is a matter of substance. Society associates national mishaps with the institutions’ malfunction. Therefore, the reform of power is not a scholar’s fantasy but a necessity sensed by society. Under these conditions, the initiative to reform power no longer depends on the ruling power's vision of the State, but rather on its political survival instinct.
The lower that social trust in institutions goes, the more can tensions rise affecting the rule of law. There is no empirical basis for discussing a proportional relationship between the two phenomena, but there definitely is a causal one. Distrust builds on itself and forms a knot from which we can only free ourselves with convincing changes.
Trust in institutions, which is progressively dwindling, could be recovered if a significant institutional innovation were undertaken that captured the country’s imagination.
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Diego Valadés is a researcher at the Institute for Legal Research and professor at the Faculty of Law at UNAM. He is a member of the National College, the Mexican Academy of Language and the College of Sinaloa. He is the author of several books on Constitutional Law, which include: Constitutional Dictatorship in Latin America, the Control of Power, Cabinet Government, and the Parliamentarization of Presidential Systems. @dvalades