 |
| URO-VAMTAC |
Animal Politico: By Adán Bustamante*, Insyde**
Translated by Rohan ChatterjeeIn recent weeks the United States has experienced numerous protests stirred up by the murder of Michael Brown, a young African-American killed by a white officer from the [Ferguson, Missouri] police department who shot him at least six times. According to police sources, Brown was suspected of participating in the robbery of a local store even though they had no evidence of it. One fact is that the operation implemented by the police department was disproportionate; they did not adhere to Use of Force protocols and fell into brutal practices that highlight the ambiguity of the U.S. policing model.
The problems could be foreseen with the frequent deployment of tactical [i.e., SWAT] teams in raids against gangs and drug dealers. Months before the events in Ferguson, some civil society organisations, like the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union], documented the implementation of the military concept in aspects of public security and the risks of a transition to a policing model much more reactive despite the maturity of oversight mechanisms.
Events in the United States should be used to reflect upon the Mexican reality. In our country the militarization of the public security agenda dates back to the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, although during the last 13 years a militarized policing model has been consolidated, which was secured by establishment of the National Gendarmerie. This project of Enrique Peña Nieto’s electoral campaign has the objective of reorienting the language used in the fight against criminal organizations and demilitarizing public security. However, in reality, the change of policy direction for public security arises from a change of language with political ends rather than a true interest in consolidating a police body that complies with social demands.
The creation of a police force, autonomous in character, of at least 40,000 officers and uniquely composed of civilians trained under the Security and Justice Agreements, was included in the Pact for Mexico. However, the contradiction soon emerged – which did not bear fruit – of starting in the fall of 2013 with 10,000 police officers from the Mexican Army and the Secretariat of the Navy. [MV Note: It turned out that soldiers and marines weren't interested in giving up their jobs.].
The obscurity in which the project developed and the contradictions in statements reflect the lack of planning and vision in the design of the new police corporation. It is enough to observe the ambiguous responsibilities that it has been assigned and the absurd time frames for putting it into operation. The urgency for starting the operation of the Gendarmerie shows a lack of judgment by the political class in understanding that the training of officers is gradual; the premature start of operations will impact negatively on professionalism and institutional strength.
The lack of transparency prevented society from getting to know the particulars of the project and/or influencing its development. In 2013 a large number of non-governmental organizations – among them INSYDE [Institute for Security and Democracy]– urged the federal government to convene discussions with expert panels, without being taken into account. The lack of attention by the Peña Nieto government to civil society, so that it could learn the characteristic tactics and operations of the new Gendarmerie, strengthened the perception of its being a paramilitary body. This combined with the fact that this force does not lay the foundation of a citizen security model due to the lack of legal status that makes it a security body for the regime.
Only through declarations by civil servants has it been possible to get information regarding the bureaucratic process of the Mexican Gendarmerie. In February 2013, during a Senate appearance, former National Security Commissioner Manuel Mondragón said that the new police force would be subject to a strict system of military discipline and that its officers would receive a hybrid training (police and military), which demonstrates that the training model was designed to privilege military training. In fact, a few days before the start of the Gendarmerie’s operations, the current Commissioner, Monte Alejandro Rubido, presented the Army and Navy as the models and confirmed that the gendarmes were in the last phase of training, “preparing themselves regarding military training.”
Having said that, the risks of the police militarization model becoming established with the National Gendarmerie are very high due to the lack of judicial standards that would regulate it and insufficient institutional and doctrinal clarity. In this sense, it is important to point out the existence of two police models with a military structure. The radical difference is that some have a centralized character like the French Gendarmerie Nationale, dependent on the Interior and Defense Ministries, which became a police force with military rules. Meanwhile, in countries like Colombia, the laws themselves stipulate police functions, even though they fit with military doctrine that includes authorizing them as an alternate reserve body in case of an international conflict; that is to say, it has a hierarchic military structure, but legally its functions are in crime prevention. Those two examples demonstrate what the Mexican model lacks, a law that determines specific powers and marks the division between military doctrine and police function.
It is important to point out that the existence of police forces with military disciplinary models and hierarchic structures are not synonymous with a militarized police. This process can only be determined by observing the tactical, operational and training characteristics, such as the type of military equipment adapted to public security functions, the military viewpoint in basic training courses and the use of reactive tactics.
With implementation of the Mexican Gendarmerie, there is the danger that the limits between police and the military positions become more distorted by attempting to create a force of proximity [closeness to the civilian population] with military training, which is contradictory, since the Gendarme training has adopted military language and tactics, officially creating a mentality in which the public is seen as a potential enemy. Additionally, inflated budgets have incentivized the acquisition of automatic weapons, armor-plated equipment and all-terrain vehicles like URO-VAMTAC. Even though they are being used for fighting criminal organizations, they can also be used against the civil population.
The leading worry for civil society is that this police body (which was created on the orders of the President and the Secretary of Government Relations [SEGOB]) does abide by political, judicial and, even less, social controls. To cap it all, the Gendarmerie lays the foundation for centralization of public security, owing to the fact that it would be able to intervene in crimes that fall under the states' jurisdiction, which marginalizes the responsibility of local authorities.
It sounds pessimistic, but the warrior-cop has arrived to stay, unless, at least, the popular will exists to repel it. Spanish original
*Adam Bustamante is a member of the Department of Applied Research on Police, Security and Criminal Justice of Insyde.
**Institute for Security and Democracy (Insyde) is an organization with a decade of work in designing solutions to fully exercise the human right to security. We seek a paradigm shift from a public security to a citizen security model, with the involvement of institutions, organizations and society. Our issues are democratic police reform, migration and human rights, and violence and the media.