Mexico Government Legitimacy Versus Conflicts of Interest

Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez*

Scandals come and go. The victim pays and disappears. Not much is usually learned from them; they don't appear to be effective inhibitors of the abuse. They feed curiosity, allow venting of anger and little else. The problems remain. So it makes little sense to dwell on the scandal and its protagonists. What remains with us is a serious defect in our public life: the use of public office for private advantage. That confusion is so enmeshed among us that whoever is caught in an open transgression is surprised by the complaint,and says: "I am a lawyer and I represent whomever"; "I am an entrepreneur and in a business that can create jobs in the country". It is irrelevant that he is a public official; it doesn't matter that he is also a legislator. The thief who is caught stealing usually denies the facts; the one who is discovered in an open conflict of interest is outraged by the accusation.

Conflict of interest, particularly in the legislative realm, has a corrosive effect that needs to be addressed: the legitimacy of their work is compromised when legislators act as delegates of their own interest or as agents of economic forces. Of course, representatives absorb the diverse interests of a society and directly or indirectly express the will of the political groups or business sectors or unions, but they cannot simply be transferers of partial interests into public life. Democracy lives though the goal of transforming these interests into public policy. A parliament is modern precisely when it breaks this medieval link that makes representatives simple messengers, following the instruction of their employers. Having legislators serving their own entrepreneurial ambition or surrendered to a sponsor breaks the basic democratic principle: the Congress as a deliberative public forum.

The legitimacy of political representation depends not only on the electoral process but also on the performance of the representatives as agents of the common interest. Of course, there certainly isn't one way to arrive at that interest; there is no single path to access it. Obviously, it involves an ambiguous and disputable notion. Which of the proposals being debated in Congress is the one that truly defends the common interest? No one can say beforehand. It is impossible to get rid of the controversy over the specific content of our laws, but it is easy to detect which conditions pervert the judgment of legislators. Let's start by saying that it is unacceptable that a lawmaker be involved in the discussion of a law while making investment calculations that depend on that law.

But Mexico has normalized the aberration that offers large conglomerates a portion of political representation. The parties have made ​​available to those whom we now call the powers-that-be seats from which they can promote their interests from within Congress itself,. The proportional pathway serves as the wrapping on this gift.

MV Note: Plurinomial or proportional representation are legislative seats gained via voters casting a vote for a party, not an individual candidate, and the parties win seats in proportion to their share of the vote. Party leaders choose who occupies these seats, making them prime rewards for favors (clientelismo).  Of the Mexican Senate’s 128 seats, 96 members are elected by direct popular vote for six-year terms; the other 32 seats are allocated based on proportional representation. The Chamber of Deputies has 500 seats; 300 members are elected by popular vote to three-year terms; the other 200 seats are allocated according to proportional representation.

The existence of a substantial bloc that doesn't acknowledge a party affiliation, but only loyalty to its business sponsor is a monstrosity. That this practice has become customary doesn't excuse it. It isn't, under any circumstances, a requirement for pluralism of representation. Economic operators are entitled to be heard and obviously have the ability to influence. To give them seats in the Congress from which they can act is, itself, a serious abdication by the political parties that perverts weak Mexican democracy.

So Purification Carpinteyro [PRD deputy and chair of Telecommunications Committee recently exposed for discussing possible business deals with a person related to the industry] is right when she demands judgment of other legislators with the severity with which she has been judged. If the revelation of her conversations demonstrates a clear conflict of interest, there are many other cases that are even more outrageous than hers: deputies and senators who owe their seats to sponsorship by the large media conglomerates and who openly act as delegates at their service . The scandal of the day should serve to do just that: display the corruption of our representative government and bring to an end the inadmissible practice of giving congressional seats to large corporate powers.

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*Jesus Silva-Herzog Marquez is a Mexican academic and essayist. He is the son of noted economist Jesus Silva-Herzog Flores, and grandson of the historian Jesús Silva Herzog. Born in 1965, he studied law at the National Auonomous University (UNAM) and has an MA in political science from Columbia University. He is currently a professor at the Autonomous Institute of Technology of Mexico (ITAM). He is a columnist for Reforma, host of "Between Three" on TV Azteca and a writer.