A weekly column by Sergio Aguayo
Translated by Shaun Twomey
Almost a year ago, Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidential election and a few days later began to negotiate the Pact for Mexico [an agreement of the three major parties to undertake a number of major reforms]. Therefore, it seems fitting that an evaluation of these past twelve months is now in order.
To begin, the rhetoric of the state of Mexico’s governor, Eruviel Ávila, sounds a bit premature and excessive. During the week of June 3, Ávila labeled president Peña Neta as a “statesman president” comparable to Winston Churchill. German philosopher Hegel defines a statesman as someone who puts into “words the wishes of his era, who listens with goodwill and serves as their instrument.” If one looks beyond the irregularities surrounding his election, it could be accepted that Peña Nieto successfully interpreted the wishes of a majority of the electorate, and that over the last year has broken down stereotypes, pushed through watershed reforms, and unleashed a revolution of hope. No doubt, he started off well.
And even still, the speed with which his image has blossomed among a good number of observers is noteworthy. Just a little over a year ago, well-respected political analysts denigrated Peña Nieto as “politically ignorant” and a walking example of "form without substance,” and often wrote him off as a “teleprompter slave”, a “product of Televisa” [a national multimedia company], or a “puppet” of Carlos Salinas [president, 1988-94]
But all that changed. Now the same analysts concede Peña Nieto’s political and media savvy, his adept finger on the pulse of today’s Mexican society, and his capacity for either forging consensus or altogether changing course when necessary. One case in point is the 2006 uprising in Atenco that he officially repressed as governor [of the state of Mexico, which borders Mexico City]. Students from Iberoamerican University chastised the president for that event last year on May 11, and at that point he assumed responsibility for his decision under the justification that the Supreme Court had “validated” the operation.
Thereafter, when he acknowledged the error of this latter action, he issued a public correction and recognized that rights had been violated. His administration also accepted these same transgressions in front of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Peña Nieto offered a public apology to the victims for the excessive use of force they suffered (the victims rejected this apology on the grounds that they have yet to receive justice, and their case is now finding its way in the international arena).
It should also be recognized that Peña Nieto knew how to adapt himself to an unexpected electoral result. His plans as leader were based on a notion of “presidentialism” with a “stabilized majority in Congress.” He was very, very close to being able to count on this majority but unpredictable lady luck (and admittedly some errors) got in the way and, consequently, the PRI [Party of the Institutional Revolution] and its natural allies – Green and PANAL – wound up with a paltry few short of the majority vote in the House and are now four short in the Senate.
Peña Nieto fought through the setback, latching onto and ultimately milking the most out of a totally unexpected proposal. In August 2012, Jesús Ortega resurrected and recycled the old idea of reaching a new understanding among the country’s major political powers. He proposed the idea to José Murat over lunch one day in the Condesa neighborhood; thereafter, Ortega convinced the PAN party under Gustavo Madero and then initiated the complex negotiations with Peña Nieto’s PRI. On December 2 the duo dropped a political bomb with the Pact for Mexico which has pushed through several important reforms. It would be absurd to deny the importance that this pact has had in laying the foundation for change in the contexts of education and telecommunications, which could be demonstrably beneficial for Mexican society.
If one reviews the official discourse of the administration over the past few months, the pact in question is essentially a political flagship for Peña Nieto, a landmark achievement that supports the premise of the president as statesman, someone capable of achieving structural reforms where others before him have tried and simply shipwrecked. According to an El Universal poll from June 3, the vast majority of Mexicans – some 74% – think that the president and his party have been the principal beneficiaries of the Pact for Mexico.
On the subject of security, relevant changes have been witnessed here as well. The Secretariat of Government Relations was transformed into a “super-secretary”; significant attention is now being paid to victims and an ambitious program of prevention; and controls are aimed to be placed around the relationship with the superpower to Mexico’s north. Without denying the merits of this new focus, all this is still accompanied by an air of social cautiousness because we have yet to see an integrated plan to combat insecurity, and no grand plan to allay this insecurity seems likely to appear anytime soon.
Will Enrique Peña Nieto pass into the annals of history as a true statesman, or will his image wind up deflated like some balloon after a grade-school birthday party? Too much depends on the political landmines that lie in wait, and on those opponents of the administration who have accumulated sufficient power. Another factor involves the decisions taken by Peña Nieto that have now eroded his possibilities for success, which will be discussed at greater length in a future column. Spanish original