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| Protesters demonstrating Peña Nieto's inauguration face tear gas and lines of police in full riot gear (Photo: Alfredo Domínguez) |
Third and final article in series on report by Mexico City Human Rights Commission regarding vandalism and police actions that occurred on December 1. See La Jornada, 4/22/2013 and 4/23/2013.
La Jornada: Adolfo Gilly
The detailed and documented report of the Human Rights Commission of the Federal District (CDHDF) regarding the events of December 1, 2012, the day of the Presidential Inauguration of Enrique Peña Nieto, leaves little room for doubt: the violence of that day could only have come from above, and both its immediate performers and operational commanders of the mobilized police units neither had, nor could they have had, any idea of the hidden political enterprise of which they were the extras.
But, as often happens, the footprints of Operation 1DMX were left everywhere. The CDHDF documented many of them, checked facts, cited sources and avoided unnecessary guesswork. On April 10, 2013, the CDHDF produced a thorough and extensive report (Recommendation 7/2013). At this point, two weeks later, none of the authorities involved have said a word. We may hope, then, now that in these things the times are slow.
In my preceding articles, I set out the main facts of the CDHDF report regarding the violent events of that day. By quoting extensively from Recommendation 7/2013, pages 28-31, I will now try to summarize the findings of the investigation conducted by the Human Rights Commission. The findings are definitive.
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1. - "As was proved, from the early hours of December 1, 2012, on the outskirts of the Legislative Palace [Chamber of Deputies, San Lázarus], for a period of more than two hours, a gathering of not more than fifty people identified as the Group in the Recommendation, deliberately threw explosive devices (firecrackers and Molotov cocktails), stones and other objects at the police, as well as causing damage to traffic signs and street furniture."
"Despite the fact that the police had a presence in that place, ... , none of the policemen present executed legitimate and effective actions using the police techniques and tactics that might have resulted in the containment and dispersion of the Group and, hence, cessation of the attacks." [Page 28]
2. - "The evidence gathered by the Commission is convincing for arguing that since at least 9:00 AM on December 1, 2012, senior commanders of the SSPDF [Mexico City Police] and the PGJDF [Attorney General's Office, Mexico City] already had the necessary information based on what had happened in the previous hours, which allowed them to make an objective assessment of the behavior pattern of members of the Group, but above all of their belligerent capacity and their persistent intention to cause damage."
2. - "The evidence gathered by the Commission is convincing for arguing that since at least 9:00 AM on December 1, 2012, senior commanders of the SSPDF [Mexico City Police] and the PGJDF [Attorney General's Office, Mexico City] already had the necessary information based on what had happened in the previous hours, which allowed them to make an objective assessment of the behavior pattern of members of the Group, but above all of their belligerent capacity and their persistent intention to cause damage."
"However, they were allowed to advance on various streets and avenues of Mexico City where for a period of nearly two hours they confirmed their bellicose capacity and their aggressive progress by causing various damages along Congress Avenue, Labor Avenue and Eje 1 Norte [main avenue], where a small group of police units of the SSPDF and the PGJDF materialized only to follow them. (See video #23) [Page 29]
3. - "For the CDHDF, it is conclusive that police efforts in these early hours in the first quadrant of the city, created conditions favorable for the Group to be nourished and to continue advancing until it mixed with other groups and political and social associations that were legitimately demonstrating along the Eje Central Lázaro Cárdenas, Juárez Avenue and Paseo de la Reforma [Avenue] up to the intersection with Insurgents Avenue."
"At these points, it was obvious that the number and location of the contingent of more than 3,000 units of all the SSPDF police members in no way met its lawful goal of deterring and inhibiting the aggressor Group. The two police agencies failed to restore order and tranquility during the two and a half hours that the Group continued on its route along the Eje Central Lázaro Cárdenas, Avenida Juárez and Paseo de la Reforma to its intersection with Insurgentes Avenue, where [the Group] finally disbanded." [Page 29]
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So far we have seen that, according to the report, the police did nothing while the Group, intact, continued on its destructive path. Now let's see what those police bodies definitely did do.
4. - "The CDHDF estimates that omissions in the police operation generated the violation of this right [to personal safety] and, consequently, to the right to personal liberty, because the persons arrested were not linked to the acts of violence; additionally, due to the absence of an adequate police operation, those who carried out acts of violence that could be constituted as crimes were not arrested in the act."
"In these terms, the CDHDF documented that while acts of violence were being carried out between 12:00 and 1:00 PM on December 1, 2012, by the Group on the Eje Central and Juárez Avenue--[acts] that warranted police intervention (asset risk); [meanwhile, at the same time,] in the first quadrant of the Historic Center of the City (on the streets of Regina, November 20, Filomeno Mata, May 5, etc.), arrests were being made of people who were demonstrating peacefully or who were in that area for personal reasons and who, in any event, did not present a risk to public order." [Pages 29-30].
5. - "According to the same radio communications, faced with the impossibility of making arrests of those engaged in criminal acts, the police force turned to subjective criteria and away from legal and Constitutional mandates. At 1:07 PM, a senior commander is heard to say:
"All those boys with backpacks, those are the vandals. Hey, those are the vandals!"
Which undoubtedly impacted the wave of illegal detentions such as those discussed in the next section." (See video # 23) [Page 30]
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The report also shows how, due to orders from senior operational commanders on December 1, peaceful demonstrators and bystanders were attacked, and public and private property was left without police protection. Those who were not only tolerated but protected were members of the Group of porros, whom nobody caught or arrested or identified. Once its task was completed, the Group "faded away", the report says, back in the direction of Reforma [Paseo de la Reforma Avenue].
6. - "As far as the command orders are concerned, [CDHDF] has proof that they were not clear, correct or timely. At some points, they were even contradictory, confusing and contrary to the general order of operations, [i.e.,] by authorizing the use of chemical agents such as tear gas; or defective, [i.e.,] in ordering police intervention or their advance, then immediately rescinding the order. The number of unclear and contradictory orders resulted in an overexposure of the police to acts of violence. Moreover, field commanders told their superiors that
'Now they [police members under their command] can't stand' the attacks." (See video # 23) " [Page 30]
"On the other hand, there are recordings of moments in which police members at various times are noticed to be responding to the attacks with the same kind of behavior as members of the Group, i.e., by throwing stones, sticks and other objects, including throwing powder from fire extinguishers." [Page 31]
7. - "It was also seen that, despite the fact that at least thirty minutes before, police units themselves alerted senior commanders of the risks to public and private property located on Juárez Avenue and Paseo de la Reforma avenue, they [senior commanders] had not had the foresight to protect them from the imminent damage that would be caused to more than twenty shops, hotels, banks and public offices."
7. - "It was also seen that, despite the fact that at least thirty minutes before, police units themselves alerted senior commanders of the risks to public and private property located on Juárez Avenue and Paseo de la Reforma avenue, they [senior commanders] had not had the foresight to protect them from the imminent damage that would be caused to more than twenty shops, hotels, banks and public offices."
"For the CDHDF, this neglectful and permissive attitude contravened the obligation of surveillance and, therefore, the protection of public and private property, to the detriment of the rights of the owners of establishments, their employees and to the detriment of the heritage of the City of Mexico." [P.31]
8. - "Finally, the worst consequence to be derived from a police effort that was as minimally successful as this one, is the violation of the right to personal security both of the demonstrators and of the public servants [police] who participated in it. The first were victims of illegal arrests and their rights to demonstrate peacefully were impinged; the second, they unjustifiably put their integrity at risk, and the fact of being police members did not obligate them to set aside their legal entitlement."
8. - "Finally, the worst consequence to be derived from a police effort that was as minimally successful as this one, is the violation of the right to personal security both of the demonstrators and of the public servants [police] who participated in it. The first were victims of illegal arrests and their rights to demonstrate peacefully were impinged; the second, they unjustifiably put their integrity at risk, and the fact of being police members did not obligate them to set aside their legal entitlement."
"For these reasons, the Commission finds proven the violation of the right to personal safety of those [police] involved in the operation and demonstrations of December 1, 2012, because of actions taken by the authorities of the Secretariat of Public Security of the Federal District and the Attorney General of the Federal District." [Page 31]
9. - The CDHDF report documented case by case--99 cases--that the arrests of people, made at random and momentary whim, occurred in places and times other than those reported by the police:
9. - The CDHDF report documented case by case--99 cases--that the arrests of people, made at random and momentary whim, occurred in places and times other than those reported by the police:
"The material facts of the investigation demonstrate that the ninety-nine cases constituted illegal detentions, since that no causes or conditions established in the Constitution of the United Mexican States and the secondary laws were given. [...] Nor was it demonstrated that the arrests were made in the act [in flagrante]. Furthermore [...] the right to know the reasons justifying the detention were not guaranteed, [nor was the right] to be brought 'without delay' before the competent authority and effective judicial control of the detention [arrest]."
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Many downtown residents and businesses had the idea, broadcast repeatedly by Televisa and other media, that the violence and destruction of that day had been the work of students from #YoSoy132.
One of the objectives of the provocation was revenge against the peaceful, democratic and nonpartisan movement of students who had put Televisa and their political constituents in check. To see if they might once and for all learn who's boss ...
Another was to warn the public with events and reassure the great powers, the Business Coordinating Council among them, regarding the politics and purposes of the new government.
Do not underestimate: From the President on down, they know their job, and they know what they want. Spanish original